

# Package ‘ClaimsProblems’

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**Type** Package

**Title** Analysis of Conflicting Claims

**Version** 0.2.1

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**Description** The analysis of conflicting claims arises when an amount has to be divided among a set of agents with claims that exceed what is available. A rule is a way of selecting a division among the claimants. This package computes the main rules introduced in the literature from the old times until nowadays. The inventory of rules covers the proportional and the adjusted proportional rules, the constrained equal awards and the constrained equal losses rules, the constrained egalitarian, the Piniles’ and the minimal overlap rules, the random arrival and the Talmud rules. Besides, the Dominguez and Thomson and the average of awards rules are also included. All of them can be found in the book of W. Thomson (2019), ‘How to divide when there isn’t enough. From Aristotle, the Talmud, and Maimonides to the axiomatics of resource allocation’, with the exception of the average of awards rule (Mirás Calvo et al. (2022), <[doi:10.1007/s00355-022-01414-6](https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-022-01414-6)>). In addition, graphical diagrams allow the user to represent, among others, the set of awards, the paths of awards, and the schedules of awards of a rule, and some indexes. A good understanding of the similarities and the differences of the rules is useful for a better decision making. Therefore this package could be helpful to students, researchers and managers alike.

**License** GPL-3

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AA

*Average of awards rule*

---

### Description

This function returns the awards vector assigned by the average of awards rule (AA) to a claims problem.

**Usage**

AA(E, d, name = FALSE)

**Arguments**

E	The endowment.
d	The vector of claims.
name	A logical value.

**Details**

Let  $E \geq 0$  be the endowment to be divided and  $d \in \mathcal{R}^n$  the vector of claims with  $d \geq 0$  and such that  $\sum_{i=1}^n d_i \geq E$ , the sum of claims exceeds the endowment.

A vector  $x = (x_1, \dots, x_n)$  is an awards vector for the claims problem  $(E, d)$  if  $0 \leq x \leq d$  and satisfies the balance requirement, that is,  $\sum_{i=1}^n x_i = E$  the sum of its coordinates is equal to  $E$ . Let  $X(E, d)$  be the set of awards vectors for  $(E, d)$ .

The average of awards rule assigns to each claims problem  $(E, d)$  the expectation of the uniform distribution defined over the set of awards vectors, that is, the centroid of  $X(E, d)$ .

Let  $\mu$  be the  $(n-1)$ -dimensional Lebesgue measure and  $V(E, d) = \mu(X(E, d))$  the measure (volume) of the set of awards  $X(E, d)$ . The average of awards rule assigns to each problem  $(E, d)$  the awards vector given by:

$$AA(E, d) = \frac{1}{V(E, d)} \int_{X(E, d)} x d\mu$$

The average of awards rule corresponds to the core-center of the associated coalitional (pessimistic) game.

**Value**

The awards vector selected by the AA rule. If name = TRUE, the name of the function (AA) as a character string.

**References**

Gonzalez-Díaz, J. and Sánchez-Rodríguez, E. (2007). A natural selection from the core of a TU game: the core-center. *International Journal of Game Theory*, 36(1), 27-46.

Mirás Calvo, M.Á., Quinteiro Sandomingo, C., and Sánchez-Rodríguez, E. (2022). The average-of-awards rule for claims problems. *Soc Choice Welf.* doi: [10.1007/s00355022014146](https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355022014146)

Mirás Calvo, M.Á., Núñez Lugilde, I., Quinteiro Sandomingo, C., and Sánchez-Rodríguez, E. (2020). An algorithm to compute the core-center rule of a claims problem with an application to the allocation of CO2 emissions. Working paper.

**See Also**

[allrules](#), [CD](#), [setofawards](#), [coalitionalgame](#)

**Examples**

```

E=10
d=c(2,4,7,8)
AA(E,d)
#The average of awards rule is self-dual: AA(E,d)=d-AA(D-E,d)
D=sum(d)
d-AA(D-E,d)

```

---

allrules

---

*Summary of the division rules*


---

**Description**

This function returns the awards vectors selected, for a given claims problem, by the rules: AA, APRO, CE, CEA, CEL, DT, MO, PIN, PRO, RA, and Talmud.

**Usage**

```
allrules(E, d, draw = TRUE, col = NULL)
```

**Arguments**

E	The endowment.
d	The vector of claims.
draw	A logical value.
col	The colours (useful only if draw=TRUE). If col=NULL then the sequence of default colours is: c("red", "blue", "green", "yellow", "pink", "coral4", "darkgray", "burlywood3", "black", "darkorange", "darkviolet").

**Details**

Let  $E \geq 0$  be the endowment to be divided and  $d \in \mathcal{R}^n$  the vector of claims with  $d \geq 0$  and such that  $\sum_{i=1}^n d_i \geq E$ , the sum of claims exceeds the endowment.

A vector  $x = (x_1, \dots, x_n)$  is an awards vector for the claims problem  $(E, d)$  if: no claimant is asked to pay ( $0 \leq x$ ); no claimant receives more than his claim ( $x \leq d$ ); and the balance requirement is satisfied, that is, the sum of the awards is equal to the endowment ( $\sum_{i=1}^n x_i = E$ ).

A rule is a function that assigns to each claims problem  $(E, d)$  an awards vector for  $(E, d)$ , that is, a division between the claimants of the amount available.

The formal definitions of the main rules are given in the corresponding function help.

**Value**

A data-frame with the awards vectors selected by the main division rules. If draw = TRUE, it displays a mosaic plot representing the data-frame.

## References

Mirás Calvo, M.Á., Quinteiro Sandomingo, C., and Sánchez-Rodríguez, E. (2022). The average-of-awards rule for claims problems. Soc Choice Welf. doi: [10.1007/s00355022014146](https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355022014146)

Thomson, W. (2019). How to divide when there isn't enough. From Aristotle, the Talmud, and Maimonides to the axiomatics of resource allocation. Cambridge University Press.

## See Also

[AA](#), [APRO](#), [CD](#), [CE](#), [CEA](#), [CEL](#), [DT](#), [MO](#), [PIN](#), [PRO](#), [RA](#), [Talmud](#), [verticalruleplot](#)

## Examples

```
E=10
d=c(2,4,7,8)
allrules(E,d)
```

---

APRO

*Adjusted proportional rule*

---

## Description

This function returns the awards vector assigned by the adjusted proportional rule (APRO) to a claims problem.

## Usage

```
APRO(E, d, name = FALSE)
```

## Arguments

E	The endowment.
d	The vector of claims.
name	A logical value.

## Details

Let  $E \geq 0$  be the endowment to be divided and  $d \in \mathcal{R}^n$  the vector of claims with  $d \geq 0$  and such that  $\sum_{i=1}^n d_i \geq E$ , the sum of claims exceeds the endowment.

For each subset  $S$  of the set of claimants  $N$ , let  $d(S) = \sum_{j \in S} d_j$  be the sum of claims of the members of  $S$  and let  $N \setminus S$  be the complementary coalition of  $S$ .

The minimal right of claimant  $i$  in  $(E, d)$  is whatever is left after every other claimant has received his claim, or 0 if that is not possible:

$$m_i(E, d) = \max\{0, E - d(N \setminus \{i\})\}, \quad i = 1, \dots, n.$$

Let  $m(E, d) = (m_1(E, d), \dots, m_n(E, d))$  be the vector of minimal rights.

The truncated claim of claimant  $i$  in  $(E, d)$  is the minimum of the claim and the endowment:

$$t_i(E, d) = \min\{d_i, E\}, \quad i = 1, \dots, n.$$

Let  $t(E, d) = (t_1(E, d), \dots, t_n(E, d))$  be the vector of truncated claims.

The adjusted proportional rule first gives to each claimant the minimal right, and then divides the remainder of the endowment  $E' = E - \sum_{i=1}^n m_i(E, d)$  proportionally with respect to the new claims. The vector of the new claims  $d'$  is determined by the minimum of the remainder and the lowered claims,  $d'_i = \min\{E - \sum_{j=1}^n m_j(E, d), d_i - m_i\}$ ,  $i = 1, \dots, n$ . Therefore:

$$APRO(E, d) = m(E, d) + PRO(E', d').$$

The adjusted proportional rule corresponds to the  $\tau$ -value of the associated (pessimistic) coalitional game.

### Value

The awards vector selected by the APRO rule. If name = TRUE, the name of the function (APRO) as a character string.

### References

Curiel, I. J., Maschler, M., and Tijs, S. H. (1987). Bankruptcy games. *Zeitschrift für operations research*, 31(5), A143-A159.

Mirás Calvo, M.Á., Núñez Lugilde, I., Quinteiro Sandomingo, C., and Sánchez-Rodríguez, E. (2021). The adjusted proportional and the minimal overlap rules restricted to the lower-half, higher-half, and middle domains. Working paper 2021-02, ECOBAS.

Thomson, W. (2019). How to divide when there isn't enough. From Aristotle, the Talmud, and Maimonides to the axiomatics of resource allocation. Cambridge University Press.

### See Also

[allrules](#), [CD](#), [PRO](#), [coalitionalgame](#)

### Examples

```
E=10
d=c(2,4,7,8)
APRO(E,d)
#The adjusted proportional rule is self-dual: APRO(E,d)=d-APRO(D-E,d)
D=sum(d)
d-APRO(D-E,d)
```

---

CD	<i>Concede-and-divide rule</i>
----	--------------------------------

---

### Description

This function returns the awards vector assigned by the concede-and-divide (CD) rule to a two-claimant problem.

### Usage

`CD(E, d, name = FALSE)`

### Arguments

E	The endowment.
d	The vector of two claims.
name	A logical value.

### Details

Let  $E \geq 0$  be the endowment to be divided and  $d = (d_1, d_2) \in \mathcal{R}^2$  the vector of claims with  $d \geq 0$  and such that the sum of the two claims exceeds the endowment  $d_1 + d_2 \geq E$ .

The concede-and-divide rule first assigns to each of the two claimants the difference between the endowment and the other agent's claim (or 0 if this difference is negative), and divides the remainder equally.

$$CD_1(E, d) = \max\{E - d_2, 0\} + \frac{E - \max\{E - d_1, 0\} - \max\{E - d_2, 0\}}{2}$$

$$CD_2(E, d) = \max\{E - d_1, 0\} + \frac{E - \max\{E - d_1, 0\} - \max\{E - d_2, 0\}}{2}$$

Several rules are extensions of the concede-and-divide rule to general populations: AA, APRO, MO, RA, and Talmud.

### Value

The awards vector selected by the CD rule. If `name = TRUE`, the name of the function (CD) as a character string.

### References

Aumann, R. and Maschler, M., (1985). Game theoretic analysis of a bankruptcy problem from the Talmud. *J. Econ. Theory* 36, 195–213.

Mirás Calvo, M. Á., Núñez Lugilde, I., Quinteiro Sandomingo, C., and Sánchez Rodríguez, E. (2021). Analyzing rules that extend the concede-and-divide principle. Preprint.

Thomson, W. (2019). How to divide when there isn't enough. From Aristotle, the Talmud, and Maimonides to the axiomatics of resource allocation. Cambridge University Press.

**See Also**

[allrules](#), [pathawards](#), [AA](#), [APRO](#), [MO](#), [RA](#), [Talmud](#)

**Examples**

```
E=10
d=c(7,8)
CD(E,d)
# Talmud, RA, MO, APRO, and AA coincide with CD for two-claimant problems
Talmud(E,d)
RA(E,d)
MO(E,d)
APRO(E,d)
AA(E,d)
```

---

 CE

*Constrained egalitarian rule*


---

**Description**

This function returns the awards vector assigned by the constrained egalitarian rule (CE) rule to a claims problem.

**Usage**

```
CE(E, d, name = FALSE)
```

**Arguments**

E	The endowment.
d	The vector of claims.
name	A logical value.

**Details**

Let  $E \geq 0$  be the endowment to be divided and  $d \in \mathcal{R}^n$  the vector of claims with  $d \geq 0$  and such that  $\sum_{i=1}^n d_i \geq E$ , the sum of claims exceeds the endowment.

Assume that the claims are ordered from small to large,  $0 \leq d_1 \leq \dots \leq d_n$ . The constrained egalitarian rule coincides with the constrained equal awards rule (CEA) applied to the problem  $(E, d/2)$  if the endowment is less or equal than the half-sum of the claims  $D/2$ . Otherwise, any additional unit is assigned to claimant 1 until she/he receives the minimum of the claim and half of  $d_2$ . If this minimum is  $d_1$ , she/he stops there. If it is not, the next increment is divided equally between claimants 1 and 2 until claimant 1 receives  $d_1$  (in this case she drops out) or they reach  $d_3/2$ . If claimant 1 leaves, claimant 2 receives any additional increment until she/he reaches  $d_2$  or  $d_3/2$ . In the case that claimant 1 and 2 reach  $d_3/2$ , any additional unit is divided between claimants 1, 2, and 3 until the first one receives  $d_1$  or they reach  $d_4/2$ , and so on.

Therefore:

If  $E \leq D/2$  then  $CE(E, d) = CEA(E, d/2) = (\min\{\frac{d_i}{2}, \lambda\})_{i \in N}$  where  $\lambda \geq 0$  is chosen so as to achieve balance.

If  $E \geq D/2$  then the CE rule assigns to claimant  $i$  the maximum of two quantities: the half-claim and the minimum of the claim and a value  $\lambda \geq 0$  chosen so as to achieve balance.

$$CE_i(E, d) = \max\left\{\frac{d_i}{2}, \min\{d_i, \lambda\}\right\}, \quad i = 1, \dots, n, \quad \text{where } \sum_{i=1}^n CE_i(E, d) = E.$$

## Value

The awards vector selected by the CE rule. If name = TRUE, the name of the function (CE) as a character string.

## References

Chun, Y., Schummer, J., Thomson, W. (2001). Constrained egalitarianism: a new solution for claims problems. *Seoul J. Economics* 14, 269–297.

Thomson, W. (2019). How to divide when there isn't enough. From Aristotle, the Talmud, and Maimonides to the axiomatics of resource allocation. Cambridge University Press.

## See Also

[allrules](#), [CEA](#), [Talmud](#), [PIN](#)

## Examples

```
E=10
d=c(2,4,7,8)
CE(E,d)
```

---

CEA

*Constrained equal awards rule*

---

## Description

This function returns the awards vector assigned by the constrained equal awards rule (CEA) to a claims problem.

## Usage

```
CEA(E, d, name = FALSE)
```

## Arguments

E	The endowment.
d	The vector of claims.
name	A logical value.

**Details**

Let  $E \geq 0$  be the endowment to be divided and let  $d \in \mathcal{R}^n$  be the vector of claims with  $d \geq 0$  and such that  $\sum_{i=1}^n d_i \geq E$ , the sum of claims exceeds the endowment.

The constrained equal awards rule (CEA) equalizes awards under the constraint that no individual's award exceeds his/her claim. Then, claimant  $i$  receives the minimum of the claim and a value  $\lambda \geq 0$  chosen so as to achieve balance.

$$CEA_i(E, d) = \min\{d_i, \lambda\}, \quad i = 1, \dots, n, \quad \text{such that} \quad \sum_{i=1}^n CEA_i(E, d) = E.$$

The constrained equal awards rule corresponds to the Dutta-Ray solution to the associated (pessimistic) coalitional game. The CEA and CEL rules are dual.

**Value**

The awards vector selected by the CEA rule. If name = TRUE, the name of the function (CEA) as a character string.

**References**

Maimonides, Moses, 1135-1204. Book of Judgements, Moznaim Publishing Corporation, New York, Jerusalem (Translated by Rabbi Elihahu Touger, 2000).

Thomson, W. (2019). How to divide when there isn't enough. From Aristotle, the Talmud, and Maimonides to the axiomatics of resource allocation. Cambridge University Press.

**See Also**

[allrules](#), [CE](#), [CEL](#), [PIN](#), [Talmud](#)

**Examples**

```
E=10
d=c(2,4,7,8)
CEA(E,d)
# CEA and CEL are dual: CEA(E,d)=d-CEL(D-E,d)
D=sum(d)
d-CEL(D-E,d)
```

---

CEL

*Constrained equal losses rule*

---

**Description**

This function returns the awards vector assigned by the constrained equal losses rule (CEL) to a claims problem.

**Usage**

```
CEL(E, d, name = FALSE)
```

**Arguments**

E	The endowment.
d	The vector of claims.
name	A logical value.

**Details**

Let  $E \geq 0$  be the endowment to be divided and let  $d \in \mathcal{R}^n$  be the vector of claims with  $d \geq 0$  and such that  $\sum_{i=1}^n d_i \geq E$ , the sum of claims exceeds the endowment.

The constrained equal losses rule (CEL) equalizes losses under the constraint that no award is negative. Then, claimant  $i$  receives the maximum of zero and the claim minus a number  $\lambda \geq 0$  chosen so as to achieve balance.

$$CEL_i(E, d) = \max\{0, d_i - \lambda\}, \quad i = 1, \dots, n, \quad \text{such that} \quad \sum_{i=1}^n CEL_i(E, d) = E.$$

CEA and CEL are dual rules.

**Value**

The awards vector selected by the CEL rule. If name = TRUE, the name of the function (CEL) as a character string.

**References**

Maimonides, Moses, 1135-1204. Book of Judgements, Moznaim Publishing Corporation, New York, Jerusalem (Translated by Rabbi Eliahau Touger, 2000).

Thomson, W. (2019). How to divide when there isn't enough. From Aristotle, the Talmud, and Maimonides to the axiomatics of resource allocation. Cambridge University Press.

**See Also**

[allrules](#), [CEA](#)

**Examples**

```
E=10
d=c(2,4,7,8)
CEL(E,d)
# CEL and CEA are dual: CEL(E,d)=d-CEA(D-E,d)
D=sum(d)
d-CEA(D-E,d)
```

---

 coalitionalgame

*Coalitional game associated with a claims problem*


---

### Description

This function returns the pessimistic and optimistic coalitional games associated with a claims problem.

### Usage

```
coalitionalgame(E, d, opt = FALSE, lex = FALSE)
```

### Arguments

E	The endowment.
d	The vector of claims.
opt	Logical parameter. If opt = TRUE, both the pessimistic and optimistic associated coalitional games are given. By default, opt = FALSE, and only the associated pessimistic coalitional game is computed.
lex	Logical parameter. If lex = TRUE, coalitions of claimants are ordered lexicographically. By default, lex = FALSE, and coalitions are ordered using their binary representations.

### Details

Let  $E \geq 0$  be the endowment to be divided and  $d \in \mathcal{R}^n$  the vector of claims with  $d \geq 0$  and such that  $\sum_{i=1}^n d_i \geq E$ , the sum of claims exceeds the endowment.

For each subset  $S$  of the set of claimants  $N$ , let  $d(S) = \sum_{j \in S} d_j$  be the sum of claims of the members of  $S$  and let  $N \setminus S$  be the complementary coalition of  $S$ .

Given a claims problem  $(E, d)$ , its associated pessimistic coalitional game is the game  $v_{pes} : 2^N \rightarrow \mathcal{R}$  assigning to each coalition  $S \in 2^N$  the real number:

$$v_{pes}(S) = \max\{0, E - d(N \setminus S)\}.$$

Given a claims problem  $(E, d)$ , its associated optimistic coalitional game is the game  $v_{opt} : 2^N \rightarrow \mathcal{R}$  assigning to each coalition  $S \in 2^N$  the real number:

$$v_{opt}(S) = \min\{E, d(S)\}.$$

The optimistic and the pessimistic coalitional games are dual games, that is, for all  $S \in 2^N$ :

$$v_{opt}(S) = E - v_{pes}(N \setminus S).$$

An efficient way to represent a nonempty coalition  $S \in 2^N$  is by identifying it with the binary sequence  $a_n a_{n-1} \dots a_1$  where  $a_i = 1$  if  $i \in S$  and  $a_i = 0$  otherwise. Therefore, each coalition  $S$

is represented by the number associated with its binary representation:  $\sum_{i \in T} 2^{i-1}$ . Then coalitions can be ordered by their associated numbers.

Alternatively, coalitions can be ordered lexicographically.

Given a claims problem  $(E, d)$ , its associated coalitional game  $v$  can be represented by the vector whose coordinates are the values assigned by  $v$  to all the nonempty coalitions. For instance, if  $n = 3$ , the associated coalitional game can be represented by the vector of the values of all the 7 nonempty coalitions, ordered using the binary representation:

$$v = [v(\{1\}), v(\{2\}), v(\{1, 2\}), v(\{3\}), v(\{1, 3\}), v(\{2, 3\}), v(\{1, 2, 3\})]$$

Alternatively, the coordinates can be ordered lexicographically:

$$v = [v(\{1\}), v(\{2\}), v(\{3\}), v(\{1, 2\}), v(\{1, 3\}), v(\{2, 3\}), v(\{1, 2, 3\})]$$

When  $n = 4$ , the associated coalitional game can be represented by the vector of the values of all the 15 nonempty coalitions, ordered using the binary representation:

$$v = [v(\{1\}), v(\{2\}), v(\{1, 2\}), v(\{3\}), v(\{1, 3\}), v(\{2, 3\}), v(\{1, 2, 3\}), v(\{4\}), v(\{1, 4\}), v(\{2, 4\}), v(\{1, 2, 4\}), v(\{3, 4\}), v(\{1, 3, 4\}), v(\{2, 3, 4\}), v(\{1, 2, 3, 4\})]$$

Alternatively, the coordinates can be ordered lexicographically:

$$v = [v(\{1\}), v(\{2\}), v(\{3\}), v(\{4\}), v(\{1, 2\}), v(\{1, 3\}), v(\{1, 4\}), v(\{2, 3\}), \dots \dots v(\{2, 4\}), v(\{3, 4\}), v(\{1, 2, 3\}), v(\{1, 2, 4\}), v(\{1, 3, 4\}), v(\{2, 3, 4\}), v(\{1, 2, 3, 4\})]$$

## Value

The pessimistic (and optimistic) associated coalitional game(s).

## References

O'Neill B (1982) A problem of rights arbitration from the Talmud. *Math Soc Sci* 2:345–371.

## See Also

[setofawards](#)

## Examples

```
E=10
d=c(2,4,7,8)
v=coalitionalgame(E,d,opt=TRUE,lex=TRUE)
#The pessimistic and optimistic coalitional games are dual games
v_pes=v$v_pessimistic_lex
v_opt=v$v_optimistic_lex
v_opt[1:14]==10-v_pes[14:1]
```

cumawardscurve

*Cumulative awards curve***Description**

The graphical representation of the cumulative curves of a rule (or several rules) with respect to a given rule, for a claims problem.

**Usage**

```
cumawardscurve(E, d, Rule = PRO, Rules, col = NULL, legend = TRUE)
```

**Arguments**

E	The endowment.
d	The vector of claims.
Rule	Principal Rule: AA, APRO, CE, CEA, CEL, DT, MO, PIN, PRO, RA, Talmud. By default, Rule = PRO.
Rules	The rules: AA, APRO, CE, CEA, CEL, DT, MO, PIN, PRO, RA, Talmud.
col	The colours. If col = NULL then the sequence of default colours is: c("red", "blue", "green", "yellow", "pink", "coral4", "darkgray", "burlywood3", "black", "darkorange", "darkviolet").
legend	A logical value. The colour legend is shown if legend = TRUE.

**Details**

Let  $E > 0$  be the endowment to be divided and  $d \in \mathcal{R}^n$  the vector of claims with  $d \geq 0$  and such that the sum of claims  $D = \sum_{i=1}^n d_i \geq E$  exceeds the endowment.

Rearrange the claims from small to large,  $0 \leq d_1 \leq \dots \leq d_n$ . The cumulative curve allows us to compare the division recommended by a specific rule  $R$  with the division the division recommended by another specific rule  $S$ .

The cumulative awards curve of a rule  $S$  with respect of a rule  $R$  for the claims problem  $(E, d)$  is the polygonal path connecting the  $n + 1$  points

$$(0, 0), \left(\frac{R_1}{E}, \frac{S_1}{E}\right), \dots, \left(\frac{\sum_{i=1}^{n-1} R_i}{E}, \frac{\sum_{i=1}^{n-1} S_i}{E}\right), (1, 1).$$

The cumulative awards curve fully captures the Lorenz ranking of rules: if a rule  $R$  Lorenz-dominates a rule  $S$  then, for each claims problem, the cumulative curve of  $R$  lies above the cumulative curve of  $S$ . If  $R = PRO$ , the cumulative curve coincides with the cumulative claims-awards curve.

*cumulativecurve* function of version 0.1.0 returned the cumulative claims-awards curve with respect to the proportional rule.

**Value**

The graphical representation of the cumulative curves of a rule (or several rules) for a claims problem.

**References**

Lorenz, M. O. (1905). Methods of measuring the concentration of wealth. Publications of the American statistical association, 9(70), 209-219.

Mirás Calvo, M.Á., Núñez Lugilde, I., Quinteiro Sandomingo, C., and Sánchez Rodríguez, E. (2022). Deviation from proportionality and Lorenz-domination for claims problems. Rev Econ Design. doi: [10.1007/s1005802200300](https://doi.org/10.1007/s1005802200300)

**See Also**

[deviationindex](#), [indexgpath](#), [lorenzcurve](#), [giniindex](#), [lorenzdominance](#), [allrules](#).

**Examples**

```
E=10
d=c(2,4,7,8)
Rule=PRO
Rules=c(AA,RA,Talmud,CEA,CEL)
cumawardscurve(E,d,Rule,Rules)
```

---

deviationindex

*Deviation index*

---

**Description**

This function returns the deviation index and the signed deviation index for a rule with respect to another rule.

**Usage**

```
deviationindex(E, d, R, S)
```

**Arguments**

E	The endowment.
d	The vector of claims.
R	A rule : AA, APRO, CE, CEA, CEL, DT, MO, PIN, PRO, RA, Talmud.
S	A rule: AA, APRO, CE, CEA, CEL, DT, MO, PIN, PRO, RA, Talmud.

## Details

Let  $E > 0$  be the endowment to be divided and  $d \in \mathcal{R}^n$  the vector of claims with  $d \geq 0$  and such that  $D = \sum_{i=1}^n d_i \geq E$ , the sum of claims  $D$  exceeds the endowment.

Rearrange the claims from small to large,  $0 \leq d_1 \leq \dots \leq d_n$ . The signed deviation index of the rule  $S$  with respect to the rule  $R$  for the problem  $(E, d)$ , denoted by  $I(R(E, d), S(E, d))$ , is the ratio of the area that lies between the identity line and the cumulative curve over the total area under the identity line.

Let  $R_0 = 0$  and  $S_0 = 0$ . For each  $k = 1, \dots, n$  define  $X_k = \frac{1}{E} \sum_{j=0}^k R_j$  and  $Y_k = \frac{1}{E} \sum_{j=0}^k S_j$ . Then

$$I(R(E, d), S(E, d)) = 1 - \sum_{k=1}^n (X_k - X_{k-1})(Y_k + Y_{k-1}).$$

In general  $-1 \leq I(R(E, d), S(E, d)) \leq 1$ .

The deviation index of the rule  $S$  with respect to the rule  $R$  for the problem  $(E, d)$ , denoted by  $I^+(R(E, d), S(E, d))$ , is the ratio of the area between the line of the cumulative sum of the distribution proposed by the rule  $R$  and the cumulative curve over the area under the line  $x = y$ .

In general  $0 \leq I^+(R(E, d), S(E, d)) \leq 1$ .

The proportionality deviation index is the deviation index when  $R = PRO$ . The proportionality deviation index of the proportional rule is zero for all claims problems. The signed proportionality deviation index is the signed deviation index with  $R = PRO$ .

*proportionalityindex* function of version 0.1.0 returned the the signed proportionality index.

## Value

The deviation index and the signed deviation index of a rule for a claims problem.

## References

Ceriani, L. and Verme, P. (2012). The origins of the Gini index: extracts from Variabilità e Mutabilità (1912) by Corrado Gini. The Journal of Economic Inequality, 10(3), 421-443.

Mirás Calvo, M.Á., Núñez Lugilde, I., Quintero Sandomingo, C., and Sánchez Rodríguez, E. (2022). Deviation from proportionality and Lorenz-domination for claims problems. Rev Econ Design. doi: [10.1007/s1005802200300y](https://doi.org/10.1007/s1005802200300y)

## See Also

[indexgpath](#), [cumawardscurve](#), [lorenzcurve](#), [giniindex](#), [lorenzdominance](#), [allrules](#).

## Examples

```
E=10
d=c(2,4,7,8)
R=CEA
S=AA
deviationindex(E,d,R,S)
#The deviation index of rule R with respect of the rule R is 0.
deviationindex(E,d,PRO,PRO)
```

---

DT *Dominguez-Thomson rule*


---

### Description

This function returns the awards vector assigned by the Dominguez-Thomson rule (DT) to a claims problem.

### Usage

DT(E, d, name = FALSE)

### Arguments

E	The endowment.
d	The vector of claims.
name	A logical value.

### Details

Let  $E \geq 0$  be the endowment to be divided and  $d \in \mathcal{R}^n$  the vector of claims with  $d \geq 0$  and such that  $\sum_{i=1}^n d_i \geq E$ , the sum of claims exceeds the endowment.

The truncated claim of claimant  $i$  in  $(E, d)$  is the minimum of the claim and the endowment.

$$t_i(E, d) = \min\{d_i, E\}, \quad i = 1, \dots, n$$

Let  $t(E, d) = (m_1(E, d), \dots, m_n(E, d))$  be the vector of truncated claims and  $b(E, d) = \frac{1}{n}t(E, d)$

The DT rule is defined recursively such that, in each step, each claimant receives the  $n$ -th part of the truncated claim.

Let  $(E^1, d^1) = (E, d)$ . For each  $k \geq 2$  define:

$$(E^k, d^k) = (E^{k-1} - \sum_{i=1}^n b_i(E^{k-1}, d^{k-1}), d^{k-1} - b(E^{k-1}, d^{k-1})).$$

In step 1, the endowment is  $E$  and the claims vector is  $d$ . For  $k \geq 2$ , the endowment is the remainder once all the claimants have received the amount of the previous steps and the new vector of claims is readjusted accordingly. Observe that neither the endowment nor each agent's claim ever increases from one step to the next. This recursive process exhausts  $E$  in the limit.

For each  $(E, d)$  the Dominguez-Thomson rule assigns the awards vector:

$$DT(E, d) = \sum_{k=1}^{\infty} b(E^k, d^k)$$

### Value

The awards vector selected by the DT rule. If name = TRUE, the name of the function (DT) as a character string.

**References**

Domínguez, D. and Thomson, W. (2006). A new solution to the problem of adjudicating conflicting claims. *Economic Theory*, 28(2), 283-307.

Thomson, W. (2019). *How to divide when there isn't enough. From Aristotle, the Talmud, and Maimonides to the axiomatics of resource allocation.* Cambridge University Press.

**See Also**

[allrules](#)

**Examples**

```
E=10
d=c(2,4,7,8)
DT(E,d)
```

---

dynamicplot

*Dynamic plot*

---

**Description**

For each claimant, it plots the awards of the chosen rules for a dynamic model with t periods.

**Usage**

```
dynamicplot(
  E,
  d,
  Rules,
  claimant,
  percentage,
  times,
  col = NULL,
  legend = TRUE
)
```

**Arguments**

E	The endowment.
d	The vector of claims
Rules	The rules: AA, APRO, CE, CEA, CEL, DT, MO, PIN, PRO, RA, Talmud.
claimant	A claimant.
percentage	A number in (0,1).
times	Number of iterations.

col	The colours. If col=NULL then the sequence of default colours is: c("red", "blue", "green", "yellow", "pink", "coral4", "darkgray", "burlywood3", "black", "darkorange", "darkviolet").
legend	A logical value. The colour legend is shown if legend=TRUE.

### Details

Let  $E \geq 0$  be the endowment to be divided and  $d \in \mathcal{R}^n$  the vector of claims with  $d \geq 0$  and such that  $\sum_{i=1}^n d_i \geq E$ , the sum of claims exceeds the endowment.

A vector  $x = (x_1, \dots, x_n)$  is an awards vector for the claims problem  $(E, d)$  if: no claimant is asked to pay ( $0 \leq x$ ); no claimant receives more than his claim ( $x \leq d$ ); and the balance requirement is satisfied, that is, the sum of the awards is equal to the endowment ( $\sum_{i=1}^n x_i = E$ ).

A rule is a function that assigns to each claims problem  $(E, d)$  an awards vector for  $(E, d)$ , that is, a division between the claimants of the amount available.

The formal definitions of the main rules are given in the corresponding function help.

Given  $l$  a natural number, the function solves each claims problem in time  $t$ , which is  $(E_t, d)$ , with  $E_t = (1 - p)^t E$ ,  $p \in (0, 1)$  and  $t = 1, \dots, l$ .

### Value

This function represents the awards proposed by different rules for a claimant if the resource decreases in each iteration by a given percentage.

### References

Thomson, W. (2019). How to divide when there isn't enough. From Aristotle, the Talmud, and Maimonides to the axiomatics of resource allocation. Cambridge University Press.

Mirás Calvo, M.Á., Núñez Lugilde, I., Quinteiro Sandomingo, C., and Sánchez-Rodríguez, E. (2020). An algorithm to compute the core-center rule of a claims problem with an application to the allocation of CO2 emissions. Working paper.

### See Also

[allrules](#), [pathawards](#), [pathawards3](#), [schedrule](#), [schedrules](#)

### Examples

```
E=10
d=c(2,4,7,8)
Rules=c(Talmud,RA,AA,PRO)
claimant=1
percentage=0.076
times=10
dynamicplot(E,d,Rules,claimant,percentage,times)
```

giniindex

*Gini index***Description**

This function returns the Gini index of any rule for a claims problem.

**Usage**

```
giniindex(E, d, Rule)
```

**Arguments**

E	The endowment.
d	The vector of claims.
Rule	A rule: AA, APRO, CE, CEA, CEL, DT, MO, PIN, PRO, RA, Talmud.

**Details**

Let  $E > 0$  be the endowment to be divided and  $d \in \mathcal{R}^n$  the vector of claims with  $d \geq 0$  and such that  $D = \sum_{i=1}^n d_i \geq E$ , the sum of claims  $D$  exceeds the endowment.

Rearrange the claims from small to large,  $0 \leq d_1 \leq \dots \leq d_n$ . The Gini index is a number aimed at measuring the degree of inequality in a distribution. The Gini index of the rule  $R$  for the problem  $(E, d)$ , denoted by  $G(R, E, d)$ , is the ratio of the area that lies between the identity line and the Lorenz curve of the rule over the total area under the identity line.

Let  $R_0(E, d) = 0$ . For each  $k = 0, \dots, n$  define  $X_k = \frac{k}{n}$  and  $Y_k = \frac{1}{E} \sum_{j=0}^k R_j(E, d)$ . Then

$$G(R, E, d) = 1 - \sum_{k=1}^n (X_k - X_{k-1})(Y_k + Y_{k-1}).$$

In general  $0 \leq G(R, E, d) \leq 1$ .

**Value**

The Gini index of a rule for a claims problem and the Gini index of the vector of claims.

**References**

Ceriani, L. and Verme, P. (2012). The origins of the Gini index: extracts from Variabilità e Mutabilità (1912) by Corrado Gini. The Journal of Economic Inequality, 10(3), 421-443.

Mirás Calvo, M.Á., Núñez Lugilde, I., Quintero Sandomingo, C., and Sánchez Rodríguez, E. (2022). Deviation from proportionality and Lorenz-domination for claims problems. Rev Econ Design. doi: [10.1007/s1005802200300y](https://doi.org/10.1007/s1005802200300y)

**See Also**

[lorenzcurve](#), [cumawardscurve](#), [deviationindex](#), [indexgpath](#), [lorenzdominance](#).

**Examples**

```

E=10
d=c(2,4,7,8)
Rule=AA
giniindex(E,d,Rule)
# The Gini index of the proportional awards coincides with the Gini index of the vector of claims
giniindex(E,d,PRO)

```

---

indexgpath

*Index path*


---

**Description**

The function returns the deviation index path or the signed deviation index path for a rule with respect to another rule for a vector of claims.

**Usage**

```

indexgpath(
  d,
  Rule = PRO,
  Rules,
  signed = TRUE,
  col = NULL,
  points = 201,
  legend = TRUE
)

```

**Arguments**

d	The vector of claims.
Rule	Principal Rule: AA, APRO, CE, CEA, CEL, DT, MO, PIN, PRO, RA, Talmud. By default, Rule = PRO.
Rules	The rules: AA, APRO, CE, CEA, CEL, DT, MO, PIN, PRO, RA, Talmud.
signed	A logical value. If signed = FALSE, it draws the deviation index path and, if signed = TRUE it draws the signed deviation index path. By default, signed = TRUE.
col	The colours. If col = NULL then the sequence of default colours is: c("red", "blue", "green", "yellow", "pink", "coral4", "darkgray", "burlywood3", "black", "darkorange", "darkviolet").
points	The number of endowment values to be drawn.
legend	A logical value. The legend is shown if legend = TRUE.

### Details

Let  $d \in \mathcal{R}^n$  be a vector of claims rearranged from small to large,  $0 \leq d_1 \leq \dots \leq d_n$ .

Given two rules  $R$  and  $S$ , consider the function  $J$  that assigns to each  $E \in (0, D]$  the value  $J(E) = I(R(E, d), S(E, d))$ , that is, the signed deviation index of the rules  $R$  and  $S$  for the problem  $(E, d)$ . The graph of  $J$  is the signed index path of  $S$  in function of the rule  $R$  for the vector of claims  $d$ .

Given two rules  $R$  and  $S$ , consider the function  $J^+$  that assigns to each  $E \in (0, D]$  the value  $J^+(E) = I^+(R(E, d), S(E, d))$ , that is, the deviation index of the rules  $R$  and  $S$  for the problem  $(E, d)$ . The graph of  $J^+$  is the index path of  $S$  in function of the rule  $R$  for the vector of claims  $d$ .

The signed index path and the index path are simple tools to visualize the discrepancy of the divisions recommended by a rule for a vector of claims with respect to the divisions recommended by another rule. If  $R = \text{PRO}$ , the function draws the proportionality deviation index path or the signed proportionality deviation index path.

*indexgpath* function of version 0.1.0 returned the signed proportionality deviation index path.

### Value

This function returns the deviation index path of a rule (or several rules) for a vector of claims.

### References

Ceriani, L. and Verme, P. (2012). The origins of the Gini index: extracts from Variabilità e Mutabilità (1912) by Corrado Gini. *The Journal of Economic Inequality*, 10(3), 421-443.

Mirás Calvo, M.Á., Núñez Lugilde, I., Quinteiro Sandomingo, C., and Sánchez Rodríguez, E. (2022). Deviation from proportionality and Lorenz-domination for claims problems. *Rev Econ Design*. doi: [10.1007/s1005802200300y](https://doi.org/10.1007/s1005802200300y)

Thomson, W. (2019). How to divide when there isn't enough. From Aristotle, the Talmud, and Maimonides to the axiomatics of resource allocation. Cambridge University Press.

### See Also

[deviationindex](#), [cumawardscurve](#), [giniindex](#), [lorenzcurve](#), [lorenzdominance](#), [allrules](#).

### Examples

```
d=c(2,4,7,8)
Rule=PRO
Rules=c(Talmud,RA,AA)
col=c("red","green","blue")
indexgpath(d,Rule,Rules,signed=TRUE,col)
```

---

lorenzcurve	<i>The Lorenz curve</i>
-------------	-------------------------

---

### Description

This function returns the Lorenz curve of any rule for a claims problem.

### Usage

```
lorenzcurve(E, d, Rules, col = NULL, legend = TRUE)
```

### Arguments

E	The endowment.
d	The vector of claims.
Rules	The rules: AA, APRO, CE, CEA, CEL, DT, MO, PIN, PRO, RA, Talmud.
col	The colours. If col=NULL then the sequence of default colors is: c("red", "blue", "green", "yellow", "pink", "coral4", "darkgray", "burlywood3", "black", "darkorange", "darkviolet").
legend	A logical value. The colour legend is shown if legend=TRUE.

### Details

Let  $E > 0$  be the endowment to be divided and  $d \in \mathcal{R}^n$  the vector of claims with  $d \geq 0$  and such that the sum of claims  $D = \sum_{i=1}^n d_i \geq E$  exceeds the endowment.

Rearrange the claims from small to large,  $0 \leq d_1 \leq \dots \leq d_n$ . The Lorenz curve represents the proportion of the awards given to each subset of claimants by a specific rule  $R$  as a function of the cumulative distribution of population.

The Lorenz curve of a rule  $R$  for the claims problem  $(E, d)$  is the polygonal path connecting the  $n + 1$  points

$$(0, 0), \left(\frac{1}{n}, \frac{R_1(E, d)}{E}\right), \dots, \left(\frac{n-1}{n}, \frac{\sum_{i=1}^{n-1} R_i(E, d)}{E}\right), (1, 1)$$

Basically, it represents the cumulative percentage of the endowment assigned by the rule to each cumulative percentage of claimants.

### Value

The graphical representation of the Lorenz curve of a rule (or several rules) for a claims problem.

### References

Lorenz, M. O. (1905). Methods of measuring the concentration of wealth. *Publications of the American statistical association*, 9(70), 209-219.

Mirás Calvo, M.Á., Núñez Lugilde, I., Quintero Sandomingo, C., and Sánchez Rodríguez, E. (2022). Deviation from proportionality and Lorenz-domination for claims problems. *Rev Econ Design*. doi: [10.1007/s1005802200300y](https://doi.org/10.1007/s1005802200300y)

**See Also**

[giniindex](#), [cumawardscurve](#), [deviationindex](#), [indexgpath](#), [lorenzdominance](#).

**Examples**

```
E=10
d=c(2,4,7,8)
Rules=c(AA,RA,Talmud,CEA,CEL)
col=c("red","blue","green","yellow","pink")
lorenzcurve(E,d,Rules,col)
```

---

lorenzdominance	<i>Lorenz-dominance relation</i>
-----------------	----------------------------------

---

**Description**

This function checks whether or not the awards assigned by two rules to a claims problem are Lorenz-comparable.

**Usage**

```
lorenzdominance(E, d, Rules, Info = FALSE)
```

**Arguments**

E	The endowment.
d	The vector of claims.
Rules	The two rules: AA, APRO, CE, CEA, CEL, DT, MO, PIN, PRO, RA, Talmud.
Info	A logical value.

**Details**

Let  $E \geq 0$  be the endowment to be divided and  $d \in \mathcal{R}^n$  the vector of claims with  $d \geq 0$  and such that  $\sum_{i=1}^n d_i \geq E$ , the sum of claims exceeds the endowment.

A vector  $x = (x_1, \dots, x_n)$  is an awards vector for the claims problem  $(E, d)$  if  $0 \leq x \leq d$  and satisfies the balance requirement, that is,  $\sum_{i=1}^n x_i = E$  the sum of its coordinates is equal to  $E$ . Let  $X(E, d)$  be the set of awards vectors for  $(E, d)$ .

Given a claims problem  $(E, d)$ , in order to compare a pair of awards vectors  $x, y \in X(E, d)$  with the Lorenz criterion, first one has to rearrange the coordinates of each allocation in a non-decreasing order. Then we say that  $x$  Lorenz-dominates  $y$  (or, that  $y$  is Lorenz-dominated by  $x$ ) if all the cumulative sums of the rearranged coordinates are greater with  $x$  than with  $y$ . That is,  $x$  Lorenz-dominates  $y$  if for each  $k = 1, \dots, n - 1$  we have that

$$\sum_{j=1}^k x_j \geq \sum_{j=1}^k y_j$$

Let  $R$  and  $R'$  be two rules. We say that  $R$  Lorenz-dominates  $R'$  if  $R(E, d)$  Lorenz-dominates  $R'(E, d)$  for all  $(E, d)$ .

**Value**

If Info = FALSE, the Lorenz-dominance relation between the awards vectors selected by both rules. If both awards vectors are equal then cod = 2. If the awards vectors are not Lorenz-comparable then cod = 0. If the awards vector selected by the first rule Lorenz-dominates the awards vector selected by the second rule then cod = 1; otherwise cod = -1. If Info = TRUE, it also gives the corresponding cumulative sums.

**References**

Lorenz, M. O. (1905). Methods of measuring the concentration of wealth. Publications of the American statistical association, 9(70), 209-219.

Mirás Calvo, M.Á., Núñez Lugilde, I., Quintero Sandomingo, C., and Sánchez Rodríguez, E. (2022). Deviation from proportionality and Lorenz-domination for claims problems. Rev Econ Design. doi: [10.1007/s1005802200300](https://doi.org/10.1007/s1005802200300)

Mirás Calvo, M.Á., Núñez Lugilde, I., Quintero Sandomingo, C., and Sánchez-Rodríguez, E. (2021). The adjusted proportional and the minimal overlap rules restricted to the lower-half, higher-half, and middle domains. Working paper 2021-02, ECOBAS.

**See Also**

[cumawardscurve](#), [deviationindex](#), [indexgpath](#), [lorenzcurve](#), [giniindex](#).

**Examples**

```
E=10
d=c(2,4,7,8)
Rules=c(AA,CEA)
lorenzdominance(E,d,Rules)
```

---

MO *Minimal overlap rule*

---

**Description**

This function returns the awards vector assigned by the minimal overlap rule rule (MO) to a claims problem.

**Usage**

```
MO(E, d, name = FALSE)
```

**Arguments**

E	The endowment.
d	The vector of claims.
name	A logical value.

### Details

Let  $E \geq 0$  be the endowment to be divided and  $d \in \mathcal{R}^n$  the vector of claims with  $d \geq 0$  and such that  $\sum_{i=1}^n d_i \geq E$ , the sum of claims exceeds the endowment.

The truncated claim of a claimant  $i$  is the minimum of the claim and the endowment:

$$t_i(E, d) = t_i = \min\{d_i, E\}, \quad i = 1, \dots, n$$

Suppose that each agent claims specific parts of  $E$  equal to her/his claim. After arranging which parts agents claim so as to “minimize conflict”, equal division prevails among all agents claiming a specific part and each agent receives the sum of the compensations she/he gets from the various parts that he claimed.

Let  $d_0 = 0$ . The minimal overlap rule is defined, for each problem  $(E, d)$  and each claimant  $i$ , as:

If  $E \leq d_n$  then

$$MO_i(E, d) = \frac{t_1}{n} + \frac{t_2 - t_1}{n-1} + \dots + \frac{t_i - t_{i-1}}{n-i+1}.$$

If  $E > d_n$  let  $s \in (d_k, d_{k+1}]$ , with  $k \in \{0, 1, \dots, n-2\}$ , be the unique solution to the equation  $\sum_{i \in N} \max\{d_i - s, 0\} = E - s$ . Then:

$$MO_i(E, d) = \frac{d_1}{n} + \frac{d_2 - d_1}{n-1} + \dots + \frac{d_i - d_{i-1}}{n-i+1}, \quad i \in \{1, \dots, k\}$$

$$MO_i(E, d) = MO_i(s, d) + d_i - s, \quad i \in \{k+1, \dots, n\}.$$

### Value

The awards vector selected by the MO rule. If name = TRUE, the name of the function (MO) as a character string.

### References

Mirás Calvo, M.A., Núñez Lugalde, I., Quinteiro Sandomingo, C., and Sánchez-Rodríguez, E. (2021). The adjusted proportional and the minimal overlap rules restricted to the lower-half, higher-half, and middle domains. Working paper 2021-02, ECOBAS.

O’Neill, B. (1982). A problem of rights arbitration from the Talmud. *Math. Social Sci.* 2, 345-371.

Thomson, W. (2019). How to divide when there isn’t enough. From Aristotle, the Talmud, and Maimonides to the axiomatics of resource allocation. Cambridge University Press.

### See Also

[allrules](#), [CD](#).

### Examples

```
E=10
d=c(2,4,7,8)
MO(E,d)
```

---

 pathawards

*The path of awards for two claimants*


---

### Description

This function returns the graphical representation of the path of awards of any rule for a claims vector and a pair of claimants.

### Usage

```
pathawards(d, claimants, Rule, col = "red", points = 201)
```

### Arguments

d	The vector of claims.
claimants	Two claimants.
Rule	The rule: AA, APRO, CE, CEA, CEL, DT, MO, PIN, PRO, RA, Talmud.
col	The colour.
points	The number of values of the endowment to draw the path.

### Details

Let  $d \in \mathcal{R}^n$ , with  $d \geq 0$ , be a vector of claims and denote  $D = \sum_{i=1}^n d_i$  the sum of claims.

The path of awards of a rule  $R$  for two claimants  $i$  and  $j$  is the parametric curve:

$$p(E) = \{(R_i(E, d), R_j(E, d)) \in \mathcal{R}^2 : E \in [0, D]\}.$$

### Value

The graphical representation of the path of awards of a rule for the given claims and a pair of claimants.

### References

Thomson, W. (2019). How to divide when there isn't enough. From Aristotle, the Talmud, and Maimonides to the axiomatics of resource allocation. Cambridge University Press.

### See Also

[pathawards3](#), [schedrule](#), [schedrules](#), [verticalruleplot](#)

**Examples**

```

d=c(2,4,7,8)
claimants=c(1,2)
Rule=Talmud
pathawards(d,claimants,Rule)
# The path of awards of the concede-and-divide rule
pathawards(c(2,3),c(1,2),CD)
#The path of awards of the DT rule for d=(d1,d2) with d2<2d1
pathawards(c(1,1.5),c(1,2),DT,col="blue",points=1001)
#The path of awards of the DT rule for d=(d1,d2) with d2>2d1
pathawards(c(1,2.5),c(1,2),DT,col="blue",points=1001)

```

---

pathawards3

*The path of awards for three claimants*

---

**Description**

This function returns the graphical representation of the path of awards of any rule for a claims vector and three claimants.

**Usage**

```
pathawards3(d, claimants, Rule, col = "red", points = 300)
```

**Arguments**

d	The vector of claims.
claimants	Three claimants.
Rule	The rule: AA, APRO, CE, CEA, CEL, DT, MO, PIN, PRO, RA, Talmud.
col	The colour of the path, by default, col="red".
points	The number of values of the endowment to draw the path.

**Details**

Let  $d \in \mathcal{R}^n$ , with  $d \geq 0$ , be a vector of claims and denote  $D = \sum_{i=1}^n d_i$  the sum of claims.

The path of awards of a rule  $R$  for three claimants  $i$ ,  $j$ , and  $k$  is the parametric curve:

$$p(E) = \{(R_i(E, d), R_j(E, d), R_k(E, d)) \in \mathcal{R}^3 : E \in [0, D]\}.$$

**Value**

The graphical representation of the path of awards of a rule for the given claims and three claimants.

**See Also**

[pathawards](#), [schedrule](#), [schedrules](#), [verticalruleplot](#)

**Examples**

```
d=c(2,4,7,8)
claimants=c(1,3,4)
Rule=Talmud
pathawards3(d,claimants,Rule)
```

---

 PIN

*Piniles' rule*


---

**Description**

This function returns the awards vector assigned by the Piniles' rule (PIN) to a claims problem.

**Usage**

```
PIN(E, d, name = FALSE)
```

**Arguments**

E	The endowment.
d	The vector of claims.
name	A logical value.

**Details**

Let  $E \geq 0$  be the endowment to be divided and  $d \in \mathcal{R}^n$  the vector of claims with  $d \geq 0$  and such that  $D = \sum_{i=1}^n d_i \geq E$ , the sum of claims  $D$  exceeds the endowment.

The Piniles' rule coincides with the constrained equal awards rule (CEA) applied to the problem  $(E, d/2)$  if the endowment is less or equal than the half-sum of the claims,  $D/2$ . Otherwise it assigns to each claimant  $i$  half of the claim,  $d_i/2$  and, then, it distributes the remainder with the CEA rule. Therefore:

If  $E \leq \frac{D}{2}$  then,

$$PIN(E, d) = CEA(E, d/2).$$

If  $E \geq \frac{D}{2}$  then,

$$PIN(E, d) = d/2 + CEA(E - D/2, d/2).$$

**Value**

The awards vector selected by the PIN rule. If name = TRUE, the name of the function (PIN) as a character string.

**References**

Piniles, H.M. (1861). Darkah shel Torah. Forester, Vienna.

Thomson, W. (2019). How to divide when there isn't enough. From Aristotle, the Talmud, and Maimonides to the axiomatics of resource allocation. Cambridge University Press.

**See Also**

[allrules](#), [CEA](#), [Talmud](#)

**Examples**

```
E=10
d=c(2,4,7,8)
PIN(E,d)
```

---

plotrule

*Plot of an awards vector*

---

**Description**

This function plots an awards vector in the set of awards vectors for a claims problem.

**Usage**

```
plotrule(E, d, Rule = NULL, awards = NULL, set = TRUE, col = "blue")
```

**Arguments**

E	The endowment.
d	The vector of claims.
Rule	A rule: AA, APRO, CE, CEA, CEL, DT, MO, PIN, PRO, RA, Talmud.
awards	An awards vector.
set	A logical value.
col	The colour.

**Details**

Let  $E \geq 0$  be the endowment to be divided and  $d \in \mathcal{R}^n$  the vector of claims with  $d \geq 0$  and such that  $\sum_{i=1}^n d_i \geq E$ , the sum of claims exceeds the endowment.

A vector  $x = (x_1, \dots, x_n)$  is an awards vector for the claims problem  $(E, d)$  if  $0 \leq x \leq d$  and satisfies the balance requirement, that is,  $\sum_{i=1}^n x_i = E$  the sum of its coordinates is equal to  $E$ . Let  $X(E, d)$  be the set of awards vectors for the problem  $(E, d)$ .

A rule is a function that assigns to each claims problem  $(E, d)$  an awards vector for  $(E, d)$ , that is, a division between the claimants of the amount available.

**Value**

If `set = TRUE`, the function creates a new figure plotting both the set of awards vectors for the claims problem and the given awards vector. Otherwise, it just adds to the current picture the point representing the given awards vector. The function only plots one awards vector at a time.

The awards vector can be introduced directly as a vector. Alternatively, we can provide a rule and then the awards vector to be plotted is the one selected by the rule for the claims problem. Therefore, if `Rule = NULL` it plots the given awards vector. Otherwise, it plots the awards vector selected by the given rule for the claims problem. In order to plot two (or more) awards vectors, draw the first one with the option `set = TRUE` and add the others, one by one, with the option `set = FALSE`.

**See Also**

[setofawards](#), [allrules](#)

**Examples**

```
E=10
d=c(2,4,7,8)
plotrule(E,d,Rule=AA,col="red")
# Plotting the awards vector (1,3,5,1) and the AA rule
# First, plot the awards vector (1,3,5,1) and the set of awards
plotrule(E,d,awards=c(1,3,5,1),col="green")
# Second, add the AA rule with the option set=FALSE
plotrule(E,d,Rule=AA,set=FALSE,col="red")
```

---

 PRO

---

*Proportional rule*


---

**Description**

This function returns the awards vector assigned by the proportional rule (PRO) to a claims problem.

**Usage**

```
PRO(E, d, name = FALSE)
```

**Arguments**

E	The endowment.
d	The vector of claims.
name	A logical value.

**Details**

Let  $E \geq 0$  be the endowment to be divided and  $d \in \mathcal{R}^n$  the vector of claims with  $d \geq 0$  and such that  $D = \sum_{i=1}^n d_i \geq E$ , the sum of claims  $D$  exceeds the endowment.

The proportional rule distributes awards proportional to claims.

$$PRO(E, d) = \frac{E}{D}d$$

**Value**

The awards vector selected by the PRO rule. If name = TRUE, the name of the function (PRO) as a character string.

**References**

Aristotle, Ethics, Thompson, J.A.K., tr. 1985. Harmondsworth: Penguin.

Thomson, W. (2019). How to divide when there isn't enough. From Aristotle, the Talmud, and Maimonides to the axiomatics of resource allocation. Cambridge University Press.

**See Also**

[allrules](#), [APRO](#)

**Examples**

```
E=10
d=c(2,4,7,8)
PRO(E,d)
```

---

problemdata

*Claims problem data*

---

**Description**

The function returns to which of the following sub-domains the claims problem belongs to: the lower-half, higher-half, and midpoint domains. In addition, the function returns the minimal rights vector, the truncated claims vector, the sum and the half-sum of claims.

**Usage**

```
problemdata(E, d, draw = FALSE)
```

**Arguments**

E	The endowment.
d	The vector of claims.
draw	A logical value.

### Details

Let  $E \geq 0$  be the endowment to be divided and  $d \in \mathcal{R}^n$  the vector of claims with  $d \geq 0$  and such that  $D = \sum_{i=1}^n d_i \geq E$ , the sum of claims  $D$  exceeds the endowment.

The lower-half domain is the sub-domain of claims problems for which the endowment is less or equal than the half-sum of claims,  $E \leq D/2$ .

The higher-half domain is the sub-domain of claims problems for which the endowment is greater or equal than the half-sum of claims,  $E \geq D/2$ .

The midpoint domain is the sub-domain of claims problems for which the endowment is equal to the half-sum of claims,  $E = D/2$ .

The minimal right of claimant  $i$  in  $(E, d)$  is whatever is left after every other claimant has received his claim, or 0 if that is not possible:

$$m_i(E, d) = \max\{0, E - d(N \setminus \{i\})\}, \quad i = 1, \dots, n.$$

Let  $m(E, d) = (m_1(E, d), \dots, m_n(E, d))$  be the vector of minimal rights.

The truncated claim of claimant  $i$  in  $(E, d)$  is the minimum of the claim and the endowment:

$$t_i(E, d) = \min\{d_i, E\}, \quad i = 1, \dots, n.$$

Let  $t(E, d) = (t_1(E, d), \dots, t_n(E, d))$  be the vector of truncated claims.

### Value

The minimal rights vector; the truncated claims vector; the sum, the half-sum of the claims, and the class (lower-half, higher-half, and midpoint domains) to which the claims problem belongs. It returns `cod = 1` if the claims problem belong to the lower-half domain, `cod = -1` if it belongs to the higher-half domain, and `cod = 0` for the midpoint domain. Moreover, if `draw = TRUE` a plot of the claims, from small to large in the interval  $[0, D]$ , is given.

### See Also

[setofawards](#), [allrules](#)

### Examples

```
E=10
d=c(2,4,7,8)
problemdata(E,d,draw=TRUE)
```

---

RA

*Random arrival rule*

---

### Description

This function returns the awards vector assigned by the random arrival rule (RA) to a claims problem.

**Usage**

RA( $E$ ,  $d$ , name = FALSE)

**Arguments**

$E$	The endowment.
$d$	The vector of claims.
name	A logical value.

**Details**

Let  $E \geq 0$  be the endowment to be divided and let  $d \in \mathcal{R}^n$  be the vector of claims with  $d \geq 0$  and such that  $\sum_{i=1}^n d_i \geq E$ , the sum of claims exceeds the endowment.

For each subset  $S$  of the set of claimants  $N$ , let  $d(S) = \sum_{j \in S} d_j$  be the sum of claims of the members of  $S$ .

The random arrival rule considers all the possible arrivals of the claimants and applies the principle “first to arrive, first to be served”. Then, for each order, the corresponding marginal worth vector assigns to each claimant the minimum of her/his claim and what remains of the endowment. The rule averages all the marginal worth vectors considering all the permutations of the elements of  $N$ .

Let  $\Pi^N$  denote the set of permutations of the set of claimants  $N$  and  $|\Pi^N|$  its cardinality. Given a permutation  $\pi \in \Pi$  and a claimant  $i \in N$  let  $\pi_{\leq i}$  denote the set of claimants that precede  $i$  in the order  $\pi$ , that is,  $\pi_{\leq i} = \{j \in N : \pi(j) < \pi(i)\}$ .

The random arrival rule assigns to each  $(E, d)$  and each  $i$  the value:

$$RA_i(E, d) = \frac{1}{|\Pi^N|} \sum_{\pi \in \Pi^N} \min\{d_i, \max\{0, E - d(\pi_{\leq i})\}\}, \quad i = 1, \dots, n$$

The random arrival rule corresponds to the Shapley value of the associated (pessimistic) coalitional game.

**Value**

The awards vector selected by the RA rule. If name = TRUE, the name of the function (RA) as a character string.

**References**

O’Neill, B. (1982). A problem of rights arbitration from the Talmud. *Math. Social Sci.* 2, 345-371.

Thomson, W. (2019). How to divide when there isn’t enough. From Aristotle, the Talmud, and Maimonides to the axiomatics of resource allocation. Cambridge University Press.

**See Also**

[allrules](#), [setofawards](#), [Talmud](#), [AA](#), [CD](#), [APRO](#)

**Examples**

```

E=10
d=c(2,4,7,8)
RA(E,d)
D=sum(d)
#The random arrival rule is self-dual: RA(E,d)= d-RA(D-E,d)
d-RA(D-E,d)

```

---

schedrule

*Schedules of awards of a rule*


---

**Description**

This function returns the graphical representation of the schedules of awards of any rule for a claims vector.

**Usage**

```
schedrule(d, claimants, Rule, col = NULL, points = 201, legend = TRUE)
```

**Arguments**

<code>d</code>	A vector of claims.
<code>claimants</code>	A subset of claimants.
<code>Rule</code>	The rule: AA, APRO, CE, CEA, CEL, DT, MO, PIN, PRO, RA, or Talmud.
<code>col</code>	The colours. If <code>col = NULL</code> then the sequence of default colours is chosen randomly.
<code>points</code>	The number of values of the endowment to draw the path.
<code>legend</code>	A logical value. The colour legend is shown if <code>legend = TRUE</code> .

**Details**

Let  $d \in \mathcal{R}^n$ , with  $d \geq 0$ , be a vector of claims and denote  $D = \sum_{i=1}^n d_i$  the sum of claims.

The schedules of awards of a rule  $R$  for claimant  $i$  is the function  $S$  that assigns to each  $E \in [0, D]$  the value:  $S(E) = R_i(E, d) \in \mathcal{R}$ . Therefore, the schedules of awards of a rule plots each claimants's award as a function of  $E$ .

**Value**

The graphical representation of the schedules of awards of a rule for a claims vector and a group of claimants.

**References**

Thomson, W. (2019). How to divide when there isn't enough. From Aristotle, the Talmud, and Maimonides to the axiomatics of resource allocation. Cambridge University Press.

**See Also**

[schedrules](#), [pathawards](#), [pathawards3](#), [verticalruleplot](#)

**Examples**

```
d=c(2,4,7,8)
Rule=Talmud
claimants=c(1,2,3,4)
col=c("red","green","yellow","blue")
schedrule(d,claimants,Rule,col)
# The schedules of awards of the concede-and-divide rule.
schedrule(c(2,4),c(1,2),CD)
```

---

schedrules

*Schedules of awards of several rules*

---

**Description**

This function returns the graphical representation of the schedules of awards of different rules for a claims vector and a given claimant.

**Usage**

```
schedrules(d, claimant, Rules, col = NULL, points = 201, legend = TRUE)
```

**Arguments**

<code>d</code>	A vector of claims.
<code>claimant</code>	A claimant.
<code>Rules</code>	The rules: AA, APRO, CE, CEA, CEL, DT, MO, PIN, PRO, RA, Talmud.
<code>col</code>	The colours. If <code>col = NULL</code> then the sequence of default colours is: <code>c("red", "blue", "green", "yellow", "pink", "coral4", "darkgray", "burlywood3", "black", "darkorange", "darkviolet")</code> .
<code>points</code>	The number of endowment values to draw the path.
<code>legend</code>	A logical value. The colour legend is shown if <code>legend = TRUE</code> .

**Details**

Let  $d \in \mathcal{R}^n$ , with  $d \geq 0$ , be a vector of claims and denote  $D = \sum_{i=1}^n d_i$  the sum of claims.

The schedules of awards of a rule  $R$  for claimant  $i$  is the function  $S$  that assigns to each  $E \in [0, D]$  the value:  $S(E) = R_i(E, d) \in \mathcal{R}$ . Therefore, the schedules of awards of a rule plots each claimants's award as a function of  $E$ .

**Value**

The graphical representation of the schedules of awards of the rules for the claims vector and the same claimant.

## References

Thomson, W. (2019). How to divide when there isn't enough. From Aristotle, the Talmud, and Maimonides to the axiomatics of resource allocation. Cambridge University Press.

## See Also

[schedrule](#), [pathawards](#), [pathawards3](#), [verticalruleplot](#)

## Examples

```
d=c(2,4,7,8)
claimant=2
Rules=c(Talmud,RA,AA)
col=c("red","green","blue")
schedrules(d,claimant,Rules,col)
```

---

setofawards	<i>Set of awards vectors for a claims problem</i>
-------------	---

---

## Description

This function plots the set of awards vectors for a claims problem with 2, 3, or 4 claimants and returns its vertices for any problem.

## Usage

```
setofawards(E, d, draw = TRUE, col = NULL)
```

## Arguments

E	The endowment.
d	The vector of claims.
draw	A logical value.
col	The colour.

## Details

Let  $E \geq 0$  be the endowment to be divided and  $d \in \mathcal{R}^n$  the vector of claims with  $d \geq 0$  and such that  $\sum_{i=1}^n d_i \geq E$ , the sum of claims exceeds the endowment.

A vector  $x = (x_1, \dots, x_n)$  is an awards vector for the claims problem  $(E, d)$  if  $0 \leq x \leq d$  and satisfies the balance requirement, that is,  $\sum_{i=1}^n x_i = E$  the sum of its coordinates is equal to  $E$ . Let  $X(E, d)$  be the set of awards vectors for the problem  $(E, d)$ .

For each subset  $S$  of the set of claimants  $N$ , let  $d(S) = \sum_{j \in S} d_j$  be the sum of claims of the members of  $S$  and let  $N \setminus S$  be the complementary coalition of  $S$ .

The minimal right of claimant  $i$  in  $(E, d)$  is whatever is left after every other claimant has received his claim, or 0 if that is not possible:

$$m_i(E, d) = \max\{0, E - d(N \setminus \{i\})\}, \quad i = 1, \dots, n.$$

Let  $m(E, d) = (m_1(E, d), \dots, m_n(E, d))$  be the vector of minimal rights.

The truncated claim of claimant  $i$  in  $(E, d)$  is the minimum of the claim and the endowment:

$$t_i(E, d) = \min\{d_i, E\}, \quad i = 1, \dots, n.$$

Let  $t(E, d) = (t_1(E, d), \dots, t_n(E, d))$  be the vector of truncated claims.

A vector  $x$  is efficient if the sum of its coordinates coincides with the endowment. The set of awards is the the set of all efficient vectors bounded by the minimal right and truncated claim vectors.

The set of awards vectors for the claims problem  $(E, d)$  can be given in terms of the minimal rights and truncated claims vectors:

$$X(E, d) = \left\{ x \in \mathcal{R}^n : \sum_{i=1}^n x_i = E, m_i(E, d) \leq x_i \leq t_i(E, d), i = 1, \dots, n \right\}$$

The set of awards vectors for a problem coincides with the core of its associated coalitional (pessimistic) game.

The vertices of the set of awards are the marginal worth vectors. For each order of the claimants, the marginal worth vectors are obtained applying the principle “first to arrive, first to be served”. Then, for each order, the corresponding marginal worth vector assigns to each claimant the minimum of her/his claim and what remains of the endowment.

## Value

The vertices of the set of awards vectors for any claims problem. For two-claimant and three-claimant problems, if `draw = TRUE` it plots the set of awards vectors. For a four-claimant problem, if `draw = TRUE`, it plots the projection of the set of awards vector over the euclidean space of the first three coordinates. For a claims problem with more than four claimants, it only displays the vertices of the set of awards. The default colours (`col = NULL`) are: red for two-claimant problems, beige for three-claimant problems, and white for four-claimant problems.

## References

Thomson, W. (2019). How to divide when there isn't enough. From Aristotle, the Talmud, and Maimonides to the axiomatics of resource allocation. Cambridge University Press.

## See Also

[plotrule](#), [problemdata](#), [AA](#), [RA](#)

## Examples

```
E=10
d=c(2,4,7,8)
setofawards(E,d,col="darkgreen")
```

---

Talmud	<i>Talmud rule</i>
--------	--------------------

---

### Description

This function returns the awards vector assigned by the Talmud rule to a claims problem.

### Usage

```
Talmud(E, d, name = FALSE)
```

### Arguments

E	The endowment.
d	The vector of claims.
name	A logical value.

### Details

Let  $E \geq 0$  be the endowment to be divided and  $d \in \mathcal{R}^n$  the vector of claims with  $d \geq 0$  and such that  $D = \sum_{i=1}^n d_i \geq E$ , the sum of claims  $D$  exceeds the endowment.

The Talmud rule coincides with the constrained equal awards rule (CEA) applied to the problem  $(E, d/2)$  if the endowment is less or equal than the half-sum of the claims,  $D/2$ . Otherwise, the Talmud rule assigns  $d/2$  and the remainder,  $E - D/2$ , is awarded with the constrained equal losses rule with claims  $d/2$ . Therefore:

If  $E \leq \frac{D}{2}$  then:

$$Talmud(E, d) = CEA(E, d/2).$$

If  $E \geq \frac{D}{2}$  then:

$$Talmud(E, d) = d/2 + CEL(E - D/2, d/2) = d - CEA(D - E, d/2).$$

The Talmud rule when applied to a two-claimant problem is often referred to as the contested garment rule and coincides with concede-and-divide rule. The Talmud rule corresponds to the nucleolus of the associated (pessimistic) coalitional game.

### Value

The awards vector selected by the Talmud rule. If name = TRUE, the name of the function (Talmud) as a character string.

### References

- Aumann, R. and Maschler, M. (1985). Game theoretic analysis of a bankruptcy problem from the Talmud. *Journal of Economic Theory* 36, 195-213.
- Thomson, W. (2019). How to divide when there isn't enough. From Aristotle, the Talmud, and Maimonides to the axiomatics of resource allocation. Cambridge University Press.

**See Also**

[allrules](#), [CEA](#), [CEL](#), [AA](#), [APRO](#), [RA](#), [CD](#).

**Examples**

```
E=10
d=c(2,4,7,8)
Talmud(E,d)
D=sum(d)
#The Talmud rule is self-dual
d-Talmud(D-E,d)
```

---

verticalruleplot	<i>Vertical rule plot</i>
------------------	---------------------------

---

**Description**

For each claimant, it plots a vertical line with his claim and a point on the awards vector of the chosen rules.

**Usage**

```
verticalruleplot(E, d, Rules, col = NULL, legend = TRUE)
```

**Arguments**

E	The endowment.
d	The vector of claims
Rules	The rules: AA, APRO, CE, CEA, CEL, DT, MO, PIN, PRO, RA, Talmud.
col	The colours. If col=NULL then the sequence of default colours is: c("red", "blue", "green", "yellow", "pink", "coral4", "darkgray", "burlywood3", "black", "darkorange", "darkviolet").
legend	A logical value. The colour legend is shown if legend=TRUE.

**Details**

Let  $E \geq 0$  be the endowment to be divided and  $d \in \mathcal{R}^n$  the vector of claims with  $d \geq 0$  and such that  $\sum_{i=1}^n d_i \geq E$ , the sum of claims exceeds the endowment.

A vector  $x = (x_1, \dots, x_n)$  is an awards vector for the claims problem  $(E, d)$  if: no claimant is asked to pay ( $0 \leq x_i$ ); no claimant receives more than his claim ( $x_i \leq d_i$ ); and the balance requirement is satisfied, that is, the sum of the awards is equal to the endowment ( $\sum_{i=1}^n x_i = E$ ).

A rule is a function that assigns to each claims problem  $(E, d)$  an awards vector for  $(E, d)$ , that is, a division between the claimants of the amount available.

The formal definitions of the main rules are given in the corresponding function help.

**Value**

This function represents the claims vector and the awards vector assigned by several rules as vertical segments.

**References**

Thomson, W. (2019). How to divide when there isn't enough. From Aristotle, the Talmud, and Maimonides to the axiomatics of resource allocation. Cambridge University Press.

**See Also**

[allrules](#), [pathawards](#), [pathawards3](#), [schedrule](#), [schedrules](#)

**Examples**

```
E=10
d=c(2,4,7,8)
Rules=c(Talmud,RA,AA)
col=c("red","green","blue")
verticalruleplot(E,d,Rules,col)
```

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